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I. INTRODUCTION

The question of admissibility of human rights petitions involves a broad
field of legal issues, which include exhaustion of domestic remedies, duplication
of procedures and other technical procedural matters. I will, however, focus on
three legal issues that have special importance in the inter-American system
because of their impact on the individual petition system. These are: the
"victim" requirement of individual communications, the so-called "fourth
instance formula" and the notion of "person" in the individual complaint
procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission).
All these questions directly refer to the admissibility ground established in
Article 47(b) of the Convention. I have decided to refer to these issues
considering that rejection of a petition on these grounds is closely related to the
merits of a case, and, consequently, those cases generally cannot be amended,
completed or corrected by the petitioner if they are dismissed by the

Commission.
The Commission has jurisdiction to review petitions that claim the
violation of the rights of individuals guaranteed in the American Convention on
*
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Human Rights (American Convention or Convention). Additionally, the
Commission has competence to review alleged violations of the rights
recognized in the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
(American Declaration or Declaration).' This competence rationemateriae of
the Inter-American Commission is therefore broader than that of the European
human rights supervisory bodies or the Human Rights Committee (HRC) which
is limited to, respectively, the European Convention and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
The Commission examines petitions in accordance to the procedures
established in the American Convention, the Commission's Statute and its
Regulations. The individual petition mechanism is gaining in importance in the
inter-American system of promotion and protection of human rights. Under the
petition system, the Commission can issue public reports on its findings of fact
and law in each individual case and can file cases before the Inter-American
Court. This Commission's individual complaint jurisdiction must not be
confused with its authority to issue reports on the general human rights
situation
3
of a specific country or on a particular human rights issue or topic.
Petitions before the Commission are filed through written submissions.
Victims, other persons or group of persons as well as any nongovernmental
entity4 have standing before the Inter-American Commission pursuant to Article
44 of the American Convention. States can also file petitions against another
state, only if both states have expressly recognized the competence of the
Commission to hear such cases.5 Once a petition is filed, the Commission will
examine the formal admission requirements for the communication and will
transmit it to the respondent state for its observations.

1.

On admissibility in the Inter-American system see THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., MANUAL

INTERNACIONAL DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 94, 95 (1990); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & DINAH SHELTON,
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: CASES AND MATERIALS 24-44 (1995); DANIEL O'DONNELL,
PROTECCION IWrERNACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 418,419 (1989); Jo M. Pasqualucci, Preliminary

Objections Before the Inter-American Court on Human Rights: Legitimate Issues and IllegitimateTactics, 40
VA.J. INT.'L L 1 (1999); MONICAPINrO, LA DENUNCIAANTELA COMISION INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS
HUMANOs 49 (1993); BERTHA SANTOSCOY, LA COMMISSION INTERAMEmCAINE DEL DE DROrrS DE L'HOMME
EL LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE SA COMPETENCE PAR LE SYSTEME DES PETITIONS INDIVIDUE.ES 31 (1995).

2.
Current Statute and Regulations of the Commission can be found in Basic Documents Pertaining
to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OAS/ser.L/V/I.4, rev. 7 (2000), available
at http://www.oas.org.
3.
These reports can be found in separate reports colloquially called "Special Reports" which
usually follow an on site visit to a country, or in "General Reports" which are included in the Annual Report
of the Commission.
4.
It is a unique provision in international human rights systems. The European System and the
UN Human Rights Committee only give standing to victims or their representatives.
5.

INTER-AM. C.H.R. CHARTER arts. 45.1- 45.2.
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II. ARTICLE 47(B) OF THE CONVENTION: GENERAL SCOPE

The Commission will declare inadmissible petitions that do not
characterize a primafacie violation of the rights recognized in the Convention
or Declaration. 6 The Commission's Statute and Regulations have a set of rules
that intend to differentiate between State Parties to the American Convention
and other OAS member States subject to the Commission's jurisdiction under
the American Declaration. For our purposes, a main conclusion is that the
grounds for dismissal of a petition established in Article 47, paragraph b of the
American Convention, applies in a very similar way to all Organization of
American States (OAS) member States, under the Convention or the
Declaration, by virtue of the authority recognized in Article 24 of the Statute, 7
and Articles 26.1, 31, 35 b and c, and 41.b of the Regulations of the
Commission (that basically reproduce the Article of the Convention in this
matter). Consequently, inadmissibility of a claim can be declared if it is evident
that the Commission lacks jurisdiction because the petition does not state facts
that tend to establish a violation of the Convention.8
Questions under this provision are usually related to issues that can not be
clearly characterized as rights protected in the Convention. For example, it
remains to be seen to what extent environmental9 and labor claims," and in
general, economic social and cultural rights, can be directly protected under the
Convention. There are specific treaties in the universal system (e.g.
International Labor Organization treaties or the United Nations International
Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) as well as in the regional
system that recognize those rights. However, their protection through individual
complaint procedures is still very limited. The Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (known as the Protocol of San Salvador), which recently entered
into force, only establishes two rights that can be subject to the Inter-American
system's individual complaint procedure.
Another issue that falls under this provision is the "victim requirement."
The Commission requires the petition to indicate a violation of the rights of a
victim, in order to establish the Commission's jurisdiction under the individual
6.
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 201 (1995).
7.
Article 24.1 of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights states: "The Regulations shall
establish the procedure to be followed in cases of communications containing accusations or complaints of
violations of human rights imputable to states that are not Parties to the American Convention on Human
Rights."
8.
INTER-AM. C.H.R. CHARTER art. 47(b).
9.
Which could be linked, in certain circumstances, to the right to life, personal integrity and
judicial protection.
10. Which can be related to the right of association, free speech, and judicial protection, among
others.
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petition system. According to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights'
jurisprudence, in order for the Commission to hear an individual case, it is
necessary to lodge "a communication or petition alleging a concrete violation
of the human rights of a specific individual."" Consequently, a case without a
victim will be declared inadmissible by the Commission. Similarly, petitions
claiming the violation of the rights of juridical persons (corporations,
nongovernmental organizations, etc.) are reputed to be inadmissible by the
Commission. We will explore some of the issues that these admissibility
requirements raise in the Inter-American system.
Ill. THE "VICTIM" REQUIREMENT
As a consequence of the broad standing established by Article 44 of the
American Convention, petitioners do not have to prove before the Commission
that they, themselves, are victims, nor that they have the consent of the victim
to present the petition on their behalf.' 2 However, the Commission requires the
petition to indicate a violation of the rights of a victim, in order to establish the
Commission's jurisdiction under the individual petition system. According to
the Court, in order for the Commission to hear an individual case, it is necessary
to lodge "a communication or petition alleging a concrete violation of the
human rights of a specific individual."' 3 A case without a victim will be
declared inadmissible by the Commission.
The Court has further referred to what it calls "self-executing laws," as
opposed to "non-self-executing laws," which require additional government
implementation in order to affect the "legal sphere of specific individuals.' '
In this regard, the Court stated that:
In the case of self-executing laws, as defined above, the violation of
human rights, whether individual or collective, occurs upon their
promulgation. Hence, a norm that deprives a portion of the
population of some of its rights - for example, because of race
automatically injures all the members of that race.'
As mentioned above, the Court considers that it is necessary to have a
"concrete violation" of the rights of a "specific person," thereby permitting it to
hear cases where a person or group of persons have been actually affected by
1i.
International Responsibilityfor the Promulgationand Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the
Convention (Arts. I and 2 of the American Convention of Human Rights, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Advisory Opinion
OC-14/94, ser. A, no. 14(1994)), available at http:llwwwloas.org [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-14/94].
12.
PINTO, supra note 1.

13.

Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, supra note 11.

14.

Jd. 41.

15.

Id.
143.
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an action or measure of the state.16 Consequently, the Court has rejected
competence to review in abstractoclaims regarding laws that have not affected
the rights of individuals under the Convention.' 7 The European Convention
requires the petitioner to be a victim, disallowing petitions in abstracto
concerning national laws.' 8 However, the victim requirement has been
expanded through a notion of "potential victim," which opens the possibility for
the Commission and Court to examine laws that have not yet been enforced or
applied. The European Court has developed the notion of "potential victim" in
certain cases where, even though a measure has not been applied, the person is
at risk by the mere existence of a law or certain administrative measures.'9 In
the Klass Case, the European Court considered that the existence of legislation
in Germany that permitted the secret surveillance of mail and
telecommunications of persons, even if such measures had not been applied in
the case argued, satisfied the victim requirement2 ° The same approach was
followed by the European Commission in the Campbell and Cosans Case where
it considered that a system of corporal punishment in schools of Scotland
violated the rights of children attending those schools, even though the alleged
victims had not yet been punished. 2' According to the Commission, to require
that corporal punishment be applied to the boys so that they could be considered
victims, would be too restrictive of the rights of the boys.
The Court's notion of victim, it argues, follows the European Court's
jurisprudence. 22 While it is true that the European Court rejects in abstracto
claims, the Inter-American Court's approach is still not clear regarding the
notion of potential victim. The Inter-American Court in Advisory Opinion OC14 did not clearly addressed if the existence of a law or practice incompatible
with the Convention, such as the corporal punishment law of Scotland in the
Campbell and Cosans Case, would be a "self-executing law" or a "non-selfexecuting law." By developing these notions the Court did not give a clear
indication on how the concept of victim would operate in such a case.
According to the test of the Inter-American Court, a corporal punishment law
could require additional Government action (the punishment itself) in order to
affect the legal sphere of an individual, which would be a questionable

16.
17.

Id. 147-49.
Case 10.792, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 144, OEA/ser.L/VIl.95, doc. 21 (1995) (Genie Lacayo Case).
18.
DONNA GOMIEN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OFTHIE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 44 (1996).
19.

P. VAN DUK AND G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION

ON HUMAN RIGHTS 52 (1998).

20.
21.
22.

id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, supra note 11, 147.
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conclusion. However, it remains to be seen how the Inter-American Court
would approach such a case.
In the cases in which these questions has been raised, the Inter-American
Court has adopted different approaches when requested to declare the
incompatibility of domestic legislation with the Convention. For example, in
its decision in the Genie Lacayo Case, the Court considered that it did not have
jurisdiction to declare the incompatibility in abstractoof Decrees 591 and 600
with the Convention.' Following its previous views in Advisory Opinion OC14/94, the Court considered that its competence was limited to the conduct of
the state and the effects of applying such laws in the case before it. It further
stated that such incompatibility in abstracto could be declared through its
advisory jurisdiction. Later, in the decision on the merits of the Genie Lacayo
Case, the Court found that even though the Decrees were in force at the time of
the criminal proceedings, they were not entirely applied in the case, and
consequently there was no violation of the Convention.' In the Loayza Tamayo
Case, however, the Court declared that "Article 2(a), (b) and (c) of Decree-Law
No. 25.659 (crime of treason) and Articles 2 and 4 of Decree-Law No. 25.475
(crime of terrorism)" were contrary to "Article 8(4) of the American
Convention."'25 The Court fell short of explicitly ordering the Decree-Laws to
be repealed, but stated "[t]hat the State of Peru shall adopt the internal legal
measures necessary to adapt Decree-Laws 25,475 (Crime of Terrorism) and
25,659 (Crime of Treason) to conform to the American Convention on Human
Rights."' A question remains as to what specific reparations the Court could
order when finding that a law violates the Convention, considering that the
repeal of incompatible laws could be an important remedy for the victims.
More importantly, the repeal of incompatible laws can constitute satisfaction
vis-d-vis the State Parties to the Convention by preventing future violations due
to its application in other cases.
The HRC also considers that it does not have competence under the
Optional Protocol of the ICCPR to review in abstracto national legislation.'
The Committee requires the alleged victim to be "actually and personally
affected. ' ' 28 The approach of the Committee, as in the Inter-American Court's
jurisprudence, is also rather restrictive. However, some scholars consider that

23.
24.
25.
26.

Case 10.792, supra note 17, IN48-51 (prelimrinary objections).
Case 10.792, supra note 17.
Case 11.154, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 144, OEA/ser.IJVII. 97, doc. 33 (1997).
Id.

27.

MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, CCPR COMMENTARY

660(1993). DOMINIC MCGOLDRiCK, THE HUMAN RIGrrS COMMITTEE 175 (1994).
28.
MCGOLDRICK, supra note 27, at 175.
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it would be instructive for the Committee to follow the European system
experience in this area.29
In Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala," regarding the notion of victim, the
Commission received a petition claiming that several provisions of the
Guatemalan Civil Code that granted the husband more conjugal rights than to
the wife violated the Convention.3 Initially, the petitioners requested the
Commission to render a decision finding such provisions incompatible in
abstracto with the Convention. The Commission was reluctant to consider the
case without a victim." Later, the petitioners provided the Commission with the
name of a victim, Mrs. Morales de Sierra. This allowed the Commission to
focus the discussion on a specific victim regarding the existence and effects of
the provisions of the Civil Code by identifying an affected person.
The Commission examined the nature of the existence of the provisions of
the Civil Code and considered that the demonstrated direct effect in the daily
life of the victim was sufficient to provide the Commission with competence
rationemateriaeto hear the case. The Commission additionally stated that the
"relevance" and "impact' of the provisions of the Civil Code were to be studied
in the merits phase. This case can constitute an important precedent to further
understand the "self-executing" or "non-self-executing" character of a law.
Moreover, it will contribute to a better understanding of the notion of "potential
victim" regarding a "norm that deprives a portion of the population of some of
its rights," as stated by the Court in Advisory Opinion OC-14, which it
considers to be a "self-executing law."
In Montoya Gonztlez v. Costa Rica,3 3 a confusing inadmissibility decision,
the Commission appears to restrict the access of petitioners to the InterAmerican system by rejecting the claim ratione personaeon the basis of lack
of standing. The Commission considered that the petitioner did not have
standing because she had to be a victim in order to have access to the
Commission. Presumably the Commission was attempting to develop the
notion of "potential victim" in order to establish its competence ratione
materiae. The substance of the claim argued that the rules of a competition
discriminated against women by assigning lower awards to the winners of that
gender. The petitioner, an athlete, decided not to participate in the competition
29.
id. at 177.
30.
Case 11.625, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 144, OEA/ser.LIVII.98, doc. 7 (1998).
31.
Under the Guatemalan Civil Code, wives are given the right and obligation of taking care of the
children and the home, and, therefore, they can only work if such activity does not interfere with these
obligations. The husband can stop his wife from working if he can demonstrate that he is supporting the
family. The Civil Code further states that the husband has primary responsibility in representing the children
of the marriage and administering their assets.
32.
See supra note 30, 1i 4-18.
33.
Case 11.553, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 119, OAS/ser.L/V/I.95, doc.7 (1997).
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for this reason. The Commission decided that, by not participating in the race,
she could not be considered a victim. From our perspective, the facts of the
petition presented enough elements to constitute an arguable claim for purposes
of admissibility. However, the Commission, apparently trying to protect its
jurisdiction from in abstractopetitions, rejected the case as inadmissible.
IV. THE FOURTH INSTANCE FORMULA

Based on Article 47(b) the Commission developed the so-called "fourth
instance formula,"' by which it considers that decisions of impartial and
independent domestic courts are not subject to scrutiny under the American
Convention. In Marzioni Case v. Argentina, it stated:
50. The nature of that role also constitutes the basis for the so-called
"fourth instance formula" applied by the Commission, consistent with
the practice of the European human rights system. The basic premise
of this formula is that the Commission cannot review the judgments
issued by the domestic courts acting within their competence and with
due judicial guarantees, unless it considers that a possible violation
of the Convention is involved.
51. The Commission is competent to declare a petition admissible
and rule on its merits when it portrays a claim that a domestic legal
decision constitutes a disregard of the right to a fair trial, or if it
appears to violate any other right guaranteed by the Convention.
However, if it contains nothing but the allegation that the decision
was wrong or unjust in itself, the petition must be dismissed under
this formula. The Commission's task is to ensure the observance of
the obligations undertaken by the States parties to the Convention, but
it cannot serve as an appellate court to examine alleged errors of
internal law or fact that may have been committed by the domestic
courts acting within theirjurisdiction. Such examination would be in
order only insofar as the mistakes entailed a possible violation of any
of the rights set forth in the Convention."

The Commission developed the formula pursuant Article 47(b) of the
Convention, to dismiss any claim that would argue exclusively ajudicial error.36
However, the formula does not apply when there is violation of due process,
34.
The "fourth instance formula" was developed initially in Case 9260, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 154,
OEA/ser. LV/II.74, doc. 10,rev. 1 (1988).
35.
Case 11.673, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 76, OEA/ser.L/VII/95. Doc. 7 (1997); Case 11/472, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 302, OEA/ser.L/V/I1.95, doc. 6 (1998); Rep. No. 34/97, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.LI./V/., doc. 6
(1997).

36.

See supra note 35, 153.
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discrimination, or a violation of other rights recognized by the Convention.3 7
In Marzioni v. Argentina, a former worker that was seeking compensation from
his employer for a work related disability claimed that Argentina's tribunals
wrongly applied the laws governing damages in labor disputes. The
Commission considered that it could not review the alleged judicial error and
consequently the petition was inadmissible. In explaining the fourth instance
formula, the Commission also relied upon jurisprudence of the European Court
and Commission on Human Rights.
Both the HRC and the European system have develop similar mechanisms
to ensure that the supervisory bodies of the corresponding human rights treaties
do not act as an appellate courts. The European Commission consistently
rejects communications that claim that a domestic court erroneously interpreted
domestic law or that it failed to make appropriate finds of fact and evidence,
unless such errors could constitute a violation of the ECHR.3 8 Similarly, the
HRC considers that it is not competent to review findings of fact or law by a
domestic court, unless the domestic proceedings are manifestly arbitrary or
constitute denial of justice.39
The Marzioni v. Argentinacase plays an important role in the evolution of
the standards of the system, considering the current trend in the hemisphere of
transition to democracy. The case clearly shows that states with functioning
judiciaries in the framework of a democratic society will benefit from a degree
of deference that the Commission gives to domestic courts. Conversely, in
authoritarian regimes or states where the judiciary's independence or
impartiality is in question, the decisions of domestic courts will be subject to
closer scrutiny by the Commission.
It is important to note that the fourth instance doctrine is directly related to
the existence of a functioning judiciary and to the level of discretion to be
afforded to a domestic court in, for example, estimating the value of evidence
or establishing the domestic law applicable to a case. Therefore, to override the
threshold set by the Commission, a petitioner would have to prove that there is
a manifest arbitrariness that violates a right protected by the Convention in the
domestic judicial proceedings.'
From an exclusively legal point of view, the fourth instance formula simply
recognizes that if agents of the state in the judiciary act in such a way that they
violate the Convention, the Commission will review the case and declare their
international responsibility. This reasoning is also valid when the Commission

37.

Id. U 40, 63.

38.

TOM ZwART, THE ADMISS[BILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PETMONS 150 (1994).

39.
ld. at 151.
40.
Case 11.67 1,Inter-Am. C.H.R. 193. OEA/ser.I/Vll.98, doc. 7 (1998); Case 11.673 supra note
35, 7 60-62.
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reviews petitions that claim the violation of the Convention by agents of any
organ of the state. However, the basic difference relies in the fact that the
violation must be "manifestly arbitrary" signaling to certain states with
problems in their judiciaries that it is clearly in their interest to improve the
independence and impartiality of the administration of justice.
Interestingly, in Narciso Palacios v. Argentina,"' the Commission
examined a petition that involved a judicial decision by Argentina's Supreme
Court in a case in which the alleged victim was dismissed from his official job
as municipal accountant and filed a suit against the decision of the Mayor of the
city. The issue in question before the Commission referred to the interpretation
of domestic law by the Supreme Court on whether Argentinean law required
exhaustion of administrative remedies before a person could resort to judicial
remedies. The petitioner argued that the Supreme Court arbitrarily changed its
jurisprudential interpretation, requiring him to exhaust administrative remedies
before being able to file a judicial complaint (a contentious administrative suit),
requirement that was not mandated by the same Court at the time he filed the
judicial suit. The Commission found that "at the time the petitioner filed his
contentious administrative suit, on August 23, 1985, against the administrative
decree of June 11, 1985, issued by the Mayor of Daireaux, mandating his
dismissal from the post of municipal accountant, it was not necessary to exhaust
the administrative process in order to accede to contentious administrative
proceedings." Furthermore, the Commission considered that "the petitioner was
denied access to this proceeding [the judicial remedy], by virtue of the
retroactive application of ajurisprudential criterion that altered the interpretation
of a legal provision applicable to his case." Presumably the Commission
considered that the petition was admissible because the violation was closely
related to due process guarantees, one of the exceptions to the application of the
fourth instance formula.
In another interesting case, Carranzav. Argentina,"2 the Commission found
that the refusal of the courts of that country to hear the case in the merits
violated several provisions of the American Convention. The Superior Court
of Chubut heard the case in which a former judge claimed the illegality of his
dismissal as judge during the defacto military regime. The Chubut Court found
it was "non-justiciable" based the inappropriate application of the "political
question doctrine." The case was then filed in "extraordinary appeal" before the
Supreme Court of Argentina (a recourse similar to the United States Supreme
Court certiorari)and this court rejected hearing the case. The Commission
considered that the lack of review of the case in the merits by the Superior Court

41.
42.

Case 10.194, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 106, OEA/ser.lJV/U, doc. 3, rev. 1 (1999).
Case 10.087, Inter-Am C.H.R. 254, OEA/ser.L/VII, doc. 7, rev. 1 (1998).
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of Chubut and the Argentinean Supreme Court could characterize a violation of
the Convention.
Interestingly, the Argentinean courts, particularly the Superior Court of
Chubut, interpreted and applied domestic law and appeared to have afforded all
due process guarantees in the case, which could have justified the application
of the fourth instance formula by the Commission. However, the exception to
the fourth instance formula was triggered, arguably, by the existence of a clear
and manifest violation of the American Convention due to the "utter disregard"
for constitutional procedure when dismissing the judge. The Commission
stated:
It is not for the Commission to pass judgment on the wisdom or
efficacy of a judicial doctrine per se, unless its application results in
a violation of any of the rights protected by the American Convention
....[Tihe Commission notes that the effect of the political question
doctrine has been to preclude a decision on the merits of the
petitioner's claims.
The removal of magistrates by order of the competent body and in
accordance with established constitutional procedure is one thing, but
the "dismissal of a magistrate" by an illegitimate authority without
competence, with utter disregard for the procedure prescribed by the
Constitution, is quite another. The first under internal legislation,
might well be non-justiciable, but the second would be
unconstitutional and unlawful, and it is up to the Courts to review it
and declare so.
This precluded any decision on the merits of the petitioner's claim
that in 1976 the military authorities had unlawfully dismissed him
from his position as a judge.43
Some authors consider that this "formula" establishes a "double
standard."'M I partially agree with such a characterization (although I prefer to
call it a differential standard). Usually adjudicatory bodies have legal doctrines
that allow for certain levels of discretion and margin of appreciation for the
local authorities being supervised. The Commission focused such level of
deference on the judiciaries, based on accepted principles and practice of
international law: 1) interpretation of domestic law is, in general, reserved to
the national courts; and 2) international human rights supervisory bodies are
complementary or subsidiary to the domestic mechanisms of human rights
43.
id.at W 45, 58, 64.
44.
See paper presented by Andrds Gil Dominguez to the Argentinean Association of Constitutional
Law Professors (Sept. 1998) (on file with author).
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protection. These doctrines, therefore, permit different state practices to coexist
regarding the protection of the same right. Similarly, the Commission has
signaled that it-will exercise a closer scrutiny of domestic judicial decisions
depending on the right involved (the right to life or to personal integrity require
closer scrutiny). This presumably also allows for a differential standard
depending on the right affected.
Additionally, the mandate of the Commission has a dual dimension:
political and judicial. In a hemisphere where States with different levels of
democratic development coexist and there are certain states that still have gross
and systematic violations of human rights in their jurisdiction, the Commission
must use its mechanisms in a creative and effective way to induce progress in
the general human rights situation. This means that all states that have
independent and impartial judiciaries will be treated with more deference than
those states where such independence or impartiality is compromised. The later
will receive closer scrutiny by the Commission. In a way, we believe that the
Commission is creatively resorting to legal presumptions similar to those used
by the Inter-American Court in the Veldsquez Rodriguez Case45 when
documenting the practice of forced disappearance of persons in Honduras as
way to shift the burden of proof to the State.
V. THE NOTION OF "PERSON" IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
Article 1.2 expressly states that, for the purposes of the Convention, the
notion of "person" refers to human beings. This provision excludes from
protection under the Convention other notions of person, such as NGOs, private
corporations and other juridical persons.
The Commission has, however, admitted and decided cases under the
American Declaration in which the alleged victim was a private organization.
In this respect, it must'be noted that neither the Declaration or the Statute or
Regulations of the Commission define the notion of "person" as the Convention
does. The Declaration only refers to "human being" in Article I; in all other
articles the Declaration refers to "person." In light of the fact that the ECHR,
for example, extends its protection to non-governmental entities, it is possible
to conclude that the American Declaration may be properly interpreted as
protecting the rights of juridical persons.
One clear example is Case No. 9250, ABC Color v. Paraguay.4 In this
case, the Commission considered that it had competence to examine a claim
filed against Paraguay regarding "the closing of the newspaper, ABC Color, that
was printed in the city of Asuncion, Paraguay." The Commission stated that

45.
46.

Vellsquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am.C.H.R., Series C No. 4.
Case 9250, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 72, OAS/ser. IJV/nl.63, doe. 10, rev. 1 (1984).
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Articles IV (right to freedom of investigation, opinion, expression and
dissemination) and XXVI (right to due process of law) of the American
Declaration were violated by Paraguay. The Commission did not refer to
individual members of ABC Color or to other human beings and their right to
receive information. Therefore, the state was found to have violated the rights
of ABC Color, a juridical person under Articles IV and XXVI of the
Declaration, by revoking its license to operate.
Similarly, Case No. 2137, Jehovah Witnesses v. Argentina,4 7 the
Commission also examined a petition filed under the Declaration. The
Commission found that the Argentinean state violated several rights under the
Declaration, including the right to freedom of religion (Art. V) and the right of
association (Art. XXI), as against the Jehovah Witnesses as a group. The
decision makes no reference to individuals, and, only in one fragment, refers to
"members of the Jehovah Witnesses group" when discussing the rights to life
and personal security as well as to equal opportunity in education.
This notion of person under the Declaration gives rise to several questions
regarding the relationship between the American Convention and the American
Declaration. If we accept the analysis above as accurately reflecting the
Commission's approach, we will in fact be accepting that there are two different
notions of "person" in the individual complaint procedures of the InterAmerican system, one under the Declaration, which establishes that
nongovernmental entities (juridical persons) also have protection under the
Declaration, and another under the Convention, which only provides protection
for violations of the rights of human beings. A question remains whether
juridical persons could assert their rights under the Declaration, when the
respondent state has ratified the American Convention. Arguably, according to
Article 29.d., ratification of the American Convention by a member State of the
OAS does not supersede the obligations under the Charter of the OAS/American
Declaration. The less restrictive criteria to interpret the relationship between the
Convention and the Declaration could be used in order to avoid the regressive
effect of eliminating the rights of certain group of "persons" through the
ratification of the Convention.
Under the American Convention, the Commission rejects petitions
regarding alleged violations against juridical persons (e.g. private corporations).
The Commission reviewed such issue in Shareholders of Banco de Lima v.
Peru,48 and considered the petition inadmissible based on the lack of

47.
Case 2137, Inter-Am C.H.R. 43, OEA/ser. IV/II.47, doc. 13, rev. 1 (1978).
48.
Case No. 10.169, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 423, OEA/ser. LIVII1.79, doc. 12, rev. 1 (1991). See also
Rep. No. 39/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 102, OEA/ser.L/V/ll., doc. 6, rev. 1 (1998); Rep. No. 106/99, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 106, OEA/ser.I/V/l., doc. 3, rev. 1 (1999); Rep. No. 103/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 106, OEA/ser.LIV/fI.,
doc. 3, rev. 1 (1999).
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competence to review claims regarding "juridical beings" under the American
Convention. The Commission considered that "what is at issue here are not the
individual property rights of the individual shareholders, but rather the
collective property rights of the company, the Banco de Lima. 4 9
More recently, the Commission, in Tabacalera Boquerdn S.A. v.
Paraguay,-" similarly rejected the claim that Paraguay violated the right to
property, among other rights, of the organization and its shareholders.
Following its previous case Shareholders of Banco de Lima v. Peru, the
Commission considered that Tabacalera was not protected under the
Convention and that the shareholders could not argue that their individual
property was affected. In making this decision, the Commission also considered
the fact that domestic remedies were exercised exclusively on behalf of the
Tabacaleraand not the shareholders.5
In this connection, the approach of the Commission raises some questions.
In many instances, property rights by human beings are exercised through
juridical persons such as Tabacalera S.A. or the Banco de Lima. In domestic
courts shareholders do not usually have individual standing before the courts
regarding claims of the company against third parties on matters related with the
normal course of business. The company performs, in practice, as a
representative of the individual interests of the shareholder. So it would be
desirable for the Commission to re-think this approach, because the current
jurisprudence may be limiting inappropriately the right to private property of
persons under the Convention.
VI. CONCLUSION

Decisions of inadmissibility on grounds set in Article 47(b) of the
American Convention have a preclusive character, arguably ending any avenue
for a petitioner to bring its claim before the inter-American system. As we have
mentioned, these decisions are very closely related to the merits of the petitions.
They, in fact, are setting human rights standards in specific cases which, of
course, increases their importance for the protection and promotion of human
rights.
The boundaries of the fourth instance formula are being drawn by the
emerging case law of the Commission on this matter. Although these limits are
yet to be clearly stated, the Commission's decisions, both in admissibility and
in the merits, are the primary reference by which we will be able to discern a
reviewable case from a fourth instance formula petition. Much academic work
is needed to understand the impact of this doctrine in the human rights
49.
50.
51.

Case No. 10. 169, supra note 48, 13.
Rep. No. 47/97, later-Am. C.H.R. 225, OEA/Ser.i/VII, doc. 7, rev. 1 (1998).
Id.
) 26-27.
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individual petition system and more active public scrutiny is required to avoid
inconsistencies in its application.
In contrast with the European and United Nations human rights
adjudicatory systems, the notion of "victim" in the inter-American system is
more related to the merits of a case than to the admissibility requirements of
petitions. It is for this reason that the Commission should have a lower level of
review of this requirement in its admissibility stage and leave a more
comprehensive study of this question to the merits phase of the case.
The question regarding the notion of "person" in the inter-American
system requires a more rigorous treatment and further discussion in order to
ensure that certain rights and persons are not overlooked by the Commission.
It is probably necessary to inquire if the current defacto legal situation requires
clarification through amendment of its case-law by the Commission or through
a Protocol to the American Convention. In either case, it is necessary to
recognize the problem and to forward proposals to further improve the current
regional machinery.
Finally, we must note that in the Commission's practice, the admissibility
decisions were taken by the Secretariat before communicating the petition to the
state and in many instances without any close scrutiny by Commissioners
themselves and without public and reasoned decision. Only until recently, the
Commission has issued inadmissibility decisions based on Article 47(b), among
others, to be published separately and in its Annual Report, which is an
important step towards guaranteeing scrutiny by the Commissioners themselves
as a safeguard for petitioners. Hopefully, this practice will ensure that no case
will be processed by the Commission without a transparent legal debate, and
consequently, the substantive standards set in those admissibility cases will be
publicly known so that the States can conform their domestic practices to the
required international standards.

